Introduction
We present proof-theoretical and semantical characterizations of two multi-agent deontic logics for dealing with normative conflicts. The resulting logics PMDL r and PMDL m are non-standard in at least two respects. First, they are nonclassical in the sense that they invalidate some inferences of the propositional fragment of Classical Logic (CL). Consequently, they also invalidate certain inferences of so-called Standard Deontic Logic (cfr. infra). The upshot of this non-classicality is that these logics consistently accommodate normative conflicts. Second, PMDL r and PMDL m are non-monotonic: previously derived conclusions may be withdrawn in the light of new premises. As such, these systems closely mirror actual normative and agentive reasoning.
Next to the usual connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, and ≡, we make use of a set of modal operators for bringing about collective actions, and of two deontic operators for mandatory and permitted states of affairs. We work within a simplified a-temporal framework from which we exclude e.g. authorities and utilities of obligations, knowledge and beliefs of agents and groups, etc.
The presentation of PMDL r and PMDL m proceeds in various steps. First, we define the monotonic, supraclassical multi-agent logic of action ML (Section 2). We illustrate how this logic deals with collective actions and discuss some further properties of our agentive modal operators. In Section 3 we extend ML with deontic modalities. The resulting logic is called MDL. We discuss some interesting properties of MDL related to collective obligations and (chains of) commands.
Next, we weaken MDL in order to consistently model less idealized settings in which intra-and interpersonal normative conflicts occur. In Section 4 we define the logic PMDL, a paraconsistent (yet monotonic) weakening of MDL that avoids explosion when faced with agents and groups with conflicting directives.
Although PMDL consistently deals with normative conflicts, it is too weak to account for many intuitive everyday normative inferences. That is why we non-monotonically strengthen PMDL in Section 5. This strengthening takes place within the adaptive logics framework for non-monotonic reasoning. The strengthening results in the adaptive logics PMDL r and PMDL m , two logics that are intermediate in inferential power between the systems PMDL and MDL. PMDL r and PMDL m approximate the classical setting in the sense that they take normative conflicts to be false whenever the premises allow for it. In doing so, PMDL m is slightly more powerful than PMDL r . This paper fits within the larger project of adaptive deontic logics devised for consistently accommodating normative conflicts (see e.g. [7, 29, 39, 41] ). It improves on earlier work presented in [6] . We compare the logics PMDL r and PMDL m to both logics of action and adaptive deontic logics in Section 6.
the stronger "J has the ability to bring about A". 2 The reason for this weaker reading has to do with the following inferences:
A ⊢ ML J A
Of (1) and (2), Kenny noted in [25] that these are too strong for formalizing the 'can' of ability. (1) is violated by anyone who has the ability to pick a card from a pack of cards without having the ability to pick a red card or the ability to pick a black one. (2) is violated by any hopeless darts player whoby accident -hits the bull's eye but lacks the ability to repeat his deed [25, 36] . For this reason, we prefer our weaker reading of the J -operators. We refer to [22, Sec. 2.3] for a more detailed treatment of (individual) ability.
As the modal operators of ML are S4-modalities, we can aggregate over actions:
The opposite direction of (3) also holds:
ML invalidates the stronger axiom schemata (A5◻ J ) and (AB◻ J ):
A's being consistent with J's actions need not imply that J brings it about that A is consistent with his/her/its actions. Moreover, A's being the case need not imply that -for all agents and groups J -J takes care (or brings it about) that A is consistent with J's actions. As indicated in Section 2.1.1, group actions are joint actions in ML. A formula ◻ J A is true only if all members of J bring about A together. In the ML-semantics, the actions of individuals and groups are represented by a set of accessibility relations all of which are structurally independent of one another. As a result, where J ⊆ ∅ K:
(5) and (6) illustrate that ML's agency operators do not allow for the inclusion of 'free riders' in their actions: for each action ◻ J A, each member of the group J is essential to J's bringing about A.
(7) and (8) illustrate that in ML a group's actions are not carried over to its members, or to smaller subgroups. If members of a group were to inherit the actions of the groups to which they belong, then if they would realize something as a team, it would follow that each of them realizes it separately. This is clearly unwanted, since, for instance, none of the agents might to be capable of realizing the action by herself.
The only constraints present on the actions of individuals and groups in ML is that they need to be consistent with the actions of other agents and groups, and with the facts. For all J, K:
Following [22, Sec. 2.3 .3], we define an agent or group's refraining from A as ◻ J ¬ ◻ J A. Refrainment is stronger than simple non-action:
(13) follows immediately by (AT◻ J ). Its converse, however, does not hold in ML:
This is as it should be: in not bringing about a state of affairs, we need not 'actively' do so. Von Wright notes that this is especially true in situations in which acting so-and-so is beyond our capacity. For example, while it may be true that an agent does not alter the course of a tornado, it seems incorrect to say that she refrains from doing so [42] . The ◻ J -operator is not a 'deliberative' action operator in the sense of [24] , since for instance the following not so intuitive formulas are ML-theorems:
If we were to add to ML a modal operator "◻" for representing (physical) necessity and call the resulting logic ML ′ , then, in line with the literature on deliberative agency, a deliberative agency-operator △ J can be defined in ML
The analogues to (15) and (16) are invalid for this new operator:
For convenience, we will in the remainder continue to use the ◻ J -operators instead of the more involving △ J -operators.
3 Adding deontic modalities: the logic MDL 3.1 Definition
Language
The language L MDL of MDL is obtained by adding the deontic operators O and P to the language of ML:
As for ML, we do not define the P-operator as the dual of the O-operator, but add it separately to the language of MDL. The reason for doing so will become clear in Section 4.
Note that, unlike e.g. Horty's treatment in [22] , only one obligation operator is introduced in MDL. Obligations are made agent-relative by suffixing a deontic operator with an agentive modality.
Where A ∈ L MDL , a formula OA is read as "it is obligatory that A". PA is read as "it is permitted that A".
Unless stated differently, we presuppose throughout this section that A, B ∈ L MDL , Γ ⊆ L MDL , and J, K ⊆ ∅ I.
Axiomatization
MDL is axiomatized by adding to ML the axiom schemata (AKO), (ADO), (ADfP), and the rule (NECO):
We write Γ ⊢ MDL A iff there are B 1 , . . . , B n where B n = A and for each i < n, B i ∈ Γ or B i is an instance of an axiom of MDL, or B i is the result of applying a rule of MDL to some B j1 , . . . , B jm where j 1 , . . . , j m < i.
(AKO), (ADO), (ADfP), and (NECO) give us full 'Standard Deontic Logic' (SDL) for the deontic operators. 
Semantics
An MDL-model is a tuple ⟨W, ⟨R J ⟩ J⊆∅I , R O , v, @⟩, where W , ⟨R J ⟩ J⊆∅I , v and @ are as before, and where R O ⊆ W × W is a serial accessibility relation.
5 Truth at a world w is defined by adding to clauses (CP)-(C J ) from Section 2.1.3 the clauses (CO) and (CP):
Moreover, ⊩ MDL A iff all MDL-models verify A, and Γ ⊩ MDL A iff all MDL-models of Γ verify A.
Discussion
As the O-operator too is a normal modal operator, we can aggregate over obligations:
Where J ⊆ ∅ K, the deontic analogues of (5)- (8) remain invalid in MDL:
And similarly for permissions. Thus, obligations and permissions too are not closed under weakening or strengthening via the addition or subtraction of agents to the group. Collective obligations of the kind interpreted by MDL are called strict collective obligations by Dignum & Royakkers [12] . A strict collective obligation to bring about A is satisfied only if all agents in the collective bring about A together.
6
Next to strict collective obligations, Dignum & Royakkers also define weak collective obligations. A weak collective obligation to bring about A is satisfied as soon as any subset of the collective brings about A. Given the language L MDL , we can define an operator O w for expressing weak collective obligations as follows:
The weak collective obligation operator O w captures the intended meaning that if it is obligatory for a group of agents to bring about a certain state of affairs, then this state of affairs ought to be brought about by some subset of the group.
Where K ⊂ ∅ J, an obligation O◻ J A is MDL-compatible with O◻ K A. Thus, even if group J has the strict collective obligation to bring about A, it might still be the case that some proper subset K of J (also) ought to bring about A. In [8] , Belnap & Perloff introduce an operator for strict joint agency by defining what it is for an agent to be essential for a (collective) action. Translated to our framework, we say that -where J ⊆ ∅ I -an agent i ∈ J is essential for ◻ J A iff (◻ J A and there is no K ⊂ ∅ J such that i ∈ K and ◻ K A).
Where J, K ⊆ ∅ I, we can define an operator O e for exclusive strict obligations:
Alternatively, we could say that a group J has the exclusive strict obligation to bring about A if all agents in J are essential for A.
Where J ⊂ ∅ K, the following weakening and strengthening properties hold for operators O w and O e in MDL:
Another form of interaction between agents occurs when actions get nested or iterated. In line with the (literal) reading of ◻ J A and OA, we read a formula ◻ J O ◻ K A as "J brings it about that it is obligatory that K brings it about that A". Alternatively, we can interpret this formula as "J issues the obligation for K to bring about A".
(30) expresses that if it is obligatory for J to issue the obligation for K to bring about A, then it need not be obligatory for J to realize A. This is as it should be, since J might realize his/her/their duty and issue the obligation to K, without K realizing his/her/their duty to actually bring about A. Hence it is not up to J to bring about A. Thus, we cannot derive
So far, the treatment of actions, obligations, and action-obligation compounds by MDL seems fine. Things change, however, when we turn to more 'messy' settings in which the requirements on agents can conflict.
Dealing with normative conflicts

MDL and normative conflicts
In Sophocles' Antigone, Creon declares the burial of Antigone's brother Polyneices illegal on the grounds that he was a traitor to the city, and that his burial would mock the loyalists who defended the city. At the same time however, Antigone faces a religious and familial obligation to bury her brother [17, p. 4] .
The conflicting obligations of Antigone and Creon to bury and not to bury Polyneices can be formalized as O ◻ a B and O ◻ c ¬B respectively (where 'a' abbreviates 'Antigone', 'c' abbreviates Creon, and 'B' abbreviates the statement "Polyneices is buried"). Conflicts between obligations for different agents or groups to bring about some state of affairs are called interpersonal conflicts in [28, 38] .
Interpersonal obligation-obligation conflicts or OO-conflicts of the kind displayed above cannot be consistently formalized in MDL, due to the validity of (31) . Where J ≠ K:
Similarly for interpersonal obligation-permission conflicts or OP-conflicts:
As has been argued extensively by moral philosophers and deontic logicians, single agents and groups too can face (intra-personal ) OO-or OP-conflicts (see e.g. [13, 16, 27, 43] ). An adult muslim living in Western Europe might for instance be permitted to drink alcohol (by law) and forbidden to drink alcohol (by his or her religion). However, such situations too cause explosion when formalized in MDL, due to the validity of:
The same story applies to the slightly weaker inferences (35) and (36) , and to 'nested' OO-or OP-conflicts:
In general, the following explosion principles are MDL-valid:
Unfortunately, real life is abundant with (inter-and intra-personal) OO-and OP-conflicts between (groups of) agents [26] . Hence we should be able to consistently accommodate such conflicts within our logic. In Section 4.2, we weaken MDL to a logic that invalidates the explosion principles (39)-(42).
Enters paraconsistency: the logic PMDL
The solution adopted here for the problem of consistently accommodating normative conflicts, is to weaken the negation connective of MDL to a paraconsistent negation connective. A negation connective "¬" is paraconsistent if it invalidates the Ex Contradictione Quodlibet (ECQ) principle:
Below we introduce a logic that weakens "¬" to a paraconsistent negation connective, namely the logic PMDL. PMDL no longer strengthens CL. Rather, it is built on top of the propositional fragment of the much weaker paraconsistent logic LP.
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For reasons of transparency, we first characterize PMDL semantically. The PMDL-semantics differs from that of MDL in that (i) we broaden the range of the assignment function v so that it includes the set of literals P ¬ = {A ∪ ¬A A ∈ P}, i.e. we define v ∶ P ¬ → ℘(W ), (ii) we replace clause (C¬) by (C¬ ′ ) and add de Morgan's laws to the semantics (clauses (C¬¬)-(C-¬∨)), and (iii) we add clauses (C¬◻ J ), (C¬ J ), (C¬O), and (C¬P) which give us the usual interrelations between dual operators. Thus, we keep clauses (CP), (C∧), (C∨), (C ), (C◻ J ), (C J ), (CO), and (CP) and add the following:
Moreover, ⊩ PMDL A iff all PMDL-models verify A, and Γ ⊩ PMDL A iff all PMDL-models of Γ verify A.
The addition of clauses (C¬◻ J ), (C¬ J ), (C¬O), and (C¬P) is necessary in order to guarantee the interdefinability of these modal operators. If, for instance, the P-operator were simply defined as the dual of the O-operator (i.e. PA = df ¬O¬A), then, due to the paraconsistency of "¬" we would no longer be able to derive P¬A from ¬OA. Similarly for the ◻ J -and J -operators. This is why all modalities are primitive in our language, and why extra semantic clauses are added in order to guarantee their usual interrelations.
Syntactically, the negation connective of LP is defined by de Morgan's laws and Excluded Middle (EM):
Since LP no longer validates (ECQ), it can consistently allow for contradictions A ∧ ¬A. A consequence of this weakening is that LP invalidates Modus Ponens, due to the definition of the implication connective in terms of the negation and disjunction connectives, cfr. Section 2.1.1. A full syntactical characterization of LP is contained in Section A of the Appendix.
Where ⟨⊡, ⟐⟩ ∈ {⟨O, P⟩, ⟨◻ J , J ⟩ J ⊆ ∅ I}, the logic PMDL is defined by adding to LP the rules (4◻ J )-(T J ) for every J ⊆ ∅ I, (DO), and (AND⊡)-(INH⟐):
In the case of (INH⊡) and (INH⟐) we also allow for the case that A is the empty string, in which case we stipulate that also ⊡A resp. ⟐A is the empty string. We write Γ ⊢ PMDL A iff there are B 1 , . . . , B n where B n = A and for each i < n, B i ∈ Γ or B i is an instance of an axiom of PMDL, or B i is the result of applying a rule of PMDL to some B j1 , . . . , B jm where j 1 , . . . , j m < i.
Note that all of the rules of PMDL are MDL-valid. As we will illustrate below, PMDL is strictly weaker than MDL. The reason why the properties of PMDL are introduced as rules -and not as axiom schemata -is that the implication connective of PMDL is not detachable: Modus Ponens is invalid in PMDL. For instance, if instead of (T◻ J ) only its weaker variant ◻ J A ⊃ A were to hold, then A would not be PMDL-derivable from ◻ J A and ◻ J A ⊃ A.
A proof of Theorem 1 is contained in Section B of the Appendix. In accordance with the goal set out for this logic, PMDL consistently tolerates all types of normative conflicts mentioned in Section 4.1; in other words, PMDL invalidates the explosion principles (39)- (42):
A price to pay?
Unfortunately, our story does not end here. Although PMDL provides a consistent treatment of normative conflicts, this treatment comes at a high price.
Not only does PMDL invalidate inferences (43)-(46) (as was desired); alas it also invalidates many other -less unwanted -MDL-valid inferences, e.g.:
In general, the Disjunctive Syllogism and Modus Ponens rules fail in PMDL:
This is a very high price to pay for the conflict-tolerance of PMDL. PMDL is way too poor to account for our everyday normative and non-normative, agentive and non-agentive reasoning.
Thus PMDL suffers from a trade-off. In Section 5 we propose to overcome this trade-off by non-monotonically strengthening PMDL within the standard format for adaptive logics [3] . The resulting adaptive logics PMDL r and PMDL m interpret a given premise set 'as consistently as possible'. On the one hand, these logics allow us to defeasibly apply all MDL-valid inference steps on the condition that the formulas to which we apply them behave consistently. On the other hand, PMDL r and PMDL m remain fully conflict-tolerant.
5 Adaptive multi-agent deontic logic 5.1 Proof-theoretical characterization of the logics PMDL r and PMDL m
Three generic rules of inference
An adaptive logic is characterized by three elements: a so-called lower limit logic (LLL), a set of abnormalities and an adaptive strategy. The LLL must be reflexive, compact and transitive. 8 In our case the lower limit logic is PMDL. The idea is that the resulting adaptive logics strengthen PMDL by considering abnormalities as false 'as much as possible', where the latter phrase is disambiguated by the adaptive strategy. Proof-theoretically, we realize this idea by (a) allowing all PMDL-inferences to remain valid in an adaptive proof and (b) allowing for some extra inferences by means of a (PMDL-invalid) conditional rule.
Let us explicate point (b) by means of some examples. Reconsider (47)-(49). Although these inferences are PMDL-invalid, the following do hold in PMDL:
Moreover, PMDL allows for the following 'weak' variants of Modus Ponens and Disjunctive Syllogism:
Whereas (47)- (51) all fail for PMDL, their weaker versions (52)-(56) are PMDLvalid. In all of these 'weakened' cases, the discussed inferences hold in PMDL in disjunction with a formula that expresses some counterintuitive consequence. For (52), this is the formula P J (A ∧ ¬A), expressing that it is permitted that the inconsistency A ∧ ¬A is consistent with J's actions. For (53), it is the formula P(A ∧ ¬A), expressing that the inconsistency A ∧ ¬A is permitted. For (54), the counterintuitive alternative is the formula J (A∧¬A), expressing that the inconsistency A ∧ ¬A is consistent with J's actions. For (55) and (56), it is the plain contradiction A ∧ ¬A. What all these counterintuitive disjuncts have in common, is that, semantically, they entail that a contradiction is verified at some PMDL-accessible world. The idea behind the conditional inference rule mentioned above in point (b) will be that we allow for the derivation of the left-hand disjuncts of the formulas derived in (52)-(56) on the assumption that the 'unwanted' right-hand disjuncts are not the case. In order to represent this assumption, each line l in an adaptive proof is equipped with a column that features a set of formulas ∆ that represent the assumptions that are made in order to derive the formula on line l. This set ∆ is the condition of line l. Conditions are subsets of a specific set of formulas: so-called abnormalities. For all adaptive logics, the set Ω of abnormalities is a set of LLL-contingent formulas characterized by one or more logical forms F. For the adaptive logics PMDL r and PMDL m , Ω = {⟐ 1 . . . ⟐ n (A ∧ ¬A) A ∈ P, ⟐ i ∈ {P} ∪ { J J ⊆ ∅ I}}. Intuitively, Ω is the set each member of which verifies an inconsistency in some accessible world in the PMDL-semantics.
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9 It is allowed that i = 0. Hence A ∧ ¬A ∈ Ω whenever A ∈ P. 10 In fact, members of Ω even cause contradictions to be verified at the actual world, since e.g.
Since every normative conflict gives rise to a member of Ω, this is at odds with Priest's analysis of conflicting norms [34, Ch. 13] . Although Priest accepts the possibility of contradicting norms, he does not accept that OO-conflicts entail outright contradictions.
Readers dissatisfied with this analysis may safely drop the rules (RO¬) and (RP¬) in the syntactic characterization of PMDL. This blocks the derivation of contradictions from OOand OP-conflicts (of course, the PMDL-semantics can be adjusted accordingly).
Call the resulting logic PMDL * . Then OA∧O¬A ⊢ PMDL PA∧¬PA and OA∧P¬A ⊢ PMDL OA ∧ ¬OA, whereas OA ∧ O¬A ⊬ PMDL * PA ∧ ¬PA and OA ∧ P¬A ⊬ PMDL * OA ∧ ¬OA.
Analogously to PMDL, PMDL * can be extended adaptively (with Ω defined as before). In the resulting extensions PMDL r * and PMDL m * , the rules (RO¬) and (RP¬) are applicable 'as much as possible', since e.g. O¬A ⊢ PMDL * ¬PA ∨ P(A ∧ ¬A) and P¬A ⊢ PMDL * ¬OA ∨ P(A ∧ ¬A).
Since our aim is to interpret a given set of premises as consistently as possible the set Ω is defined in such a way that each normative conflict gives rise to a (disjunction of) abnormalities in PMDL. This is illustrated in the following table. Let A ∈ P:
Where A ∈ P, it is easy to see that due to the validity of de Morgan's laws the inferences in this table can be generalized to conflicts between more complex formulas. These will give rise to disjunctions of abnormalities. Let for instance A = A 1 ∨ A 2 . Then, for example:
If
can be further analyzed into a (longer) disjunction of abnormalities. Adaptive logics take abnormalities to be false as long as there is no good reason to assume otherwise. This idea is made technically precise by means of two mechanisms: (i) a generic conditional rule RC that makes it possible to derive formulas conditionally and (ii) an adaptive strategy with a corresponding marking definition which determines when the assumption specified in the condition of a line is violated. If such a violation occurs, the condition is 'marked' and the derivation is disabled in the proof.
Let Γ be a set of premises, and let A ∆ abbreviate that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆. Where Θ ⊆ Ω, the generic conditional rule RC is defined as follows:
Applied to (52)-(56), RC allows us to derive from the premises the lefthand disjunct on the assumption that the right-hand disjunct is false. E.g. for (52), we can derive O ◻ J B from O ◻ J (¬A ∨ B) and O ◻ J A on the condition {P (A ∧ ¬A)}. The same reasoning applies to (53)-(56).
Next to RC, adaptive proofs make use of two other -less complicatedgeneric rules: the premise introduction rule PREM, and the unconditional rule RU:
PREM allows to introduce premises on the empty condition. RU gives the adaptive logic all the power of its LLL: whenever B is PMDL-derivable from A 1 , . . . , A n it is also derivable in the adaptive logic. As for the conditional rule RC, the conditions on which the A i 's are derived are carried forward to the line on which B is derived. Note, however, that -just like PREM -RU does not allow us to introduce new conditions in an adaptive proof.
Let us take a look at a concrete example. Suppose that we have the premises O ◻ J ¬p and O ◻ J (p ∨ q). We enter the premises via the premise introduction rule:
Given (52), we can apply RC to the premises at lines 1 and 2 and derive O ◻ J q on the condition {P J (p ∧ ¬p)}:
Now suppose that we introduce a new premise P ◻ J p at line 4:
In view of (60), we can use RU in order to derive P J (p ∧ ¬p) from the formulas at lines 1 and 4. Since the conditions of these lines are empty, the condition of line 5 is empty too. At line 5 we have derived the condition of line 3. Thus, the assumption made at line 3 that P J (p ∧ ¬p) is false can no longer be upheld at stage 5 of the proof. Therefore we mark line 3 with a "✓" sign to denote that the formula at this line is no longer considered derived. This marking mechanism is governed by a marking definition, which differs depending on the adaptive strategy used. Before we can introduce the marking definitions for the different strategies however, some more terminology is required.
Two strategies
At the beginning of Section 5.1.1 we mentioned that adaptive logics are characterized by a LLL, a set of abnormalities, and an adaptive strategy. The logics PMDL r and PMDL m both have PMDL as their LLL and Ω as their set of abnormalities. They differ only in the adaptive strategy they employ. Whereas PMDL r uses the reliability strategy, PMDL m uses the minimal abnormality strategy. Proof-theoretically, the strategy is governed by a marking mechanism as mentioned above. Each strategy makes use of a different marking definition which takes care of the markings in adaptive proofs. We first define the marking definition for the reliability strategy. Next, we turn to the marking definition for minimal abnormality. We illustrate the difference between both definitions by means of an example.
Where ∆ is a non-empty finite set of abnormalities we write Dab(∆) instead of ⋁ ∆. Dab(∆) is called a disjunction of abnormalities, or Dab-formula. In case Dab(∆) is derived at some stage s of the proof on the condition ∅ and for no ∆ ′ ⊂ ∆, Dab(∆ ′ ) has been derived at stage s on the condition ∅, then Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s. Where ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . . are the minimal Dab-formulas at stage s derived from Γ, we define the set of unreliable formulas at stage s by U s (Γ) = ∆ 1 ∪ ∆ 2 ∪ . . .. The idea behind the marking definition for the reliability strategy is to mark lines whose condition contains unreliable formulas.
Definition 1 (Marking for reliability). Line i with condition ∆ is marked at
We start a PMDL r -proof from Γ by entering the premises:
, we can apply RC to lines 1 and 3 and conditionally derive O ◻ J r at line 5:
At stage 6 of the proof, U 6 (Γ) = {P J (p ∧ ¬p), P J (q ∧ ¬q)} in view of the Dab-formula derived at line 6. Since the condition of line 5 intersects with U 6 (Γ), line 5 is marked at stage 6 in view of Definition 1.
Reliability is a very cautious strategy. As soon as an abnormality occurs in some minimal Dab-formula derived in a proof, all inferences that rely on the falsity of this abnormality are marked. In the example above, J's duty to bring about r is not PMDL r -derivable since it cannot be guaranteed that p behaves consistently in all accessible worlds. However, in this example J can consistently satisfy all of his/her/its duties by bringing about ¬p, ¬q, and r. Hence, we might want to apply a different strategy -the minimal abnormality strategy -that allows for some slightly 'bolder' inferences.
Suppose that the proof from Γ is a PMDL m -proof, and that we continue it as follows (we repeat the proof from line 5 onwards):
Note that, if this were a PMDL r -proof, lines 5 and 7 would be marked at stage 7 of the proof. Not so for PMDL m however. The minimal abnormality strategy is 'bolder' than reliability in that it assumes that, when a minimal Dab-formula has been derived, only one of the disjuncts of this formula need be true. Since in the example O ◻ J r is derivable on the condition {P J (p ∧ ¬p)} and on the condition {P J (p ∧ ¬p)}, and since only one of these abnormalities needs to be true in order to verify the Dab-formula derived at line 6, we can still safely assume that the other abnormality is false.
Technically, this is realized as follows. A choice set of Σ = {∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . .} is a set that contains one element out of each member of Σ. A minimal choice set of Σ is a choice set of Σ of which no proper subset is a choice set of Σ. Where Dab(∆ 1 ), Dab(∆ 2 ), . . . are the minimal Dab-formulas that are derived at stage s, Φ s (Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of {∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . .}.
Definition 2 (Marking for minimal abnormality).
Where A ∈ L MDL is derived at line i of a proof from Γ on a condition ∆, line i is marked at stage s iff (i) there is no ∆ ′ ∈ Φ s (Γ) such that ∆ ′ ∩ ∆ = ∅, or (ii) for some ∆ ′ ∈ Φ s (Γ), there is no line at which A is derived on a condition Θ for which ∆ ′ ∩ Θ = ∅.
The reader can easily verify that -in view of Definition 2 -lines 5 and 7 of the proof remain unmarked at stage 7.
Note that -whichever strategy is used -markings may come and go in adaptive proofs. A line may be marked at some stage s of the proof, and unmarked again at a later stage s ′ . Before we can define a consequence relation for the logics PMDL r and PMDL m , we need a stable criterion for derivability:
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Definition 3. A is finally derived from Γ at line i of a proof at finite stage s iff (i) line i is not marked at stage s, and (ii) every extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.
Where a PMDL r -proof makes use of Definition 1 and a PMDL m -proof makes use of Definition 2, consequence relations for PMDL r and PMDL m are defined as follows: Definition 4. Γ ⊢ PMDL r A (A is finally PMDL r -derivable from Γ) iff there is a PMDL r -proof in which A is finally derived from Γ at some line of a proof from Γ.
Definition 5. Γ ⊢ PMDL m A (A is finally PMDL
m -derivable from Γ) iff there is a PMDL m -proof in which A is finally derived from Γ at some line of a proof from Γ.
Thus, where Γ
Here are some more illustrations of the proof theory for PMDL r and PMDL m . In the remainder, we write PMDL x as a generic name for both logics (x ∈ {r, m}).
We start a PMDL x -proof from Γ 1 by entering the premises:
In view of Definitions 4 and 5, Γ
We start a PMDL x -proof from Γ 2 by entering the premises:
In view of Definitions 4 and 5, Γ 2 ⊢ PMDL x O ◻ J p.
Semantics and meta-theory for PMDL r and PMDL m
Where x ∈ {r, m}, the PMDL x -semantics proceeds in the style of Shoham (see [37, ?] ) by selecting a certain subset of the PMDL-models. Let Ab(M ), the abnormal part of the model M , abbreviate the set of abnormalities verified by M , i.e. Ab(M ) = {A ∈ Ω M ⊩ PMDL A}. The minimal abnormality strategy selects all PMDL-models of a premise set Γ which have a minimal abnormal part (with respect to set-inclusion):
The semantic consequence relation for PMDL m is defined by selecting all minimally abnormal PMDL-models: Definition 7. Γ ⊩ PMDL m A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal PMDLmodels.
Before we can define the semantic consequence relation for PMDL r , we need some more terminology. We say that a Dab-formula Dab(∆) is a Dabconsequence of Γ if it is PMDL-derivable from Γ; it is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ if there is no ∆ ′ ⊂ ∆ such that Dab(∆ ′ ) is a Dab-consequence of Γ. The set of formulas that are unreliable with respect to Γ, denoted by U (Γ), is defined by:
. is the set of formulas that are unreliable with respect to Γ.
The semantic consequence relation for PMDL r is defined by selecting all reliable PMDL-models: Definition 10. Γ ⊩ PMDL r A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
For any adaptive logic in standard format which has a LLL that is sound and complete with respect to its semantics, there is a generic proof that the adaptive logic is sound and complete with respect to its semantics:
For PMDL r , the proof of Theorem 2 follows immediately from Theorem 1 from Section 4.2 and Corollary 2 from [3] . For PMDL m , the proof follows immediately from Theorem 1 from Section 4.2 and Theorem 9 from [3] .
The fact that the set of PMDL x -models of Γ is a subset of the set of PMDL-models of Γ immediately ensures that PMDL x strengthens PMDL.
, and M r Γ denote the set of PMDL-models, minimally abnormal PMDL-models, resp. reliable PMDL-models of Γ, we also know that:
Theorem 4 is shown generically for adaptive logics in standard format as Corollary 1 in [3] .
In case no Dab-formulas are derivable from a premise set by means of the LLL, it is safe to consider all abnormalities as false. As a consequence, the adaptive logic will then yield the same consequence set as the logic that interprets all abnormalities as false (or equivalently, as the logic that fully validates the inference rules whose application the adaptive logic only allows conditionally). This logic is called the upper limit logic of an adaptive logic. The upper limit logic of an adaptive logic is obtained by adding to its LLL one or more axioms and/or rules that trivialize exactly those formulas that are members of Ω. The upper limit logic ULL of PMDL x is defined by adding to PMDL the rule (ECQ). ULL is related to PMDL as set out by the Derivability Adjustment Theorem:
The set of Dab-consequences derivable from the premise set determines the amount to which the consequence set of PMDL x resembles the ULLconsequence set. This is why adaptive logicians say that PMDL
x adapts itself to a premise set. PMDL
x is always at least as strong as PMDL and maximally as strong as ULL:
In view of Theorem 11 from [3] , it follows immediately that:
If Γ is normal, i.e. if U (Γ) = ∅, then we can even prove a stronger result:
For the proofs of Theorems 5-7, and for an overview of further meta-theoretic properties of adaptive logics, we refer to [3] .
The reader may have noticed that ULL trivializes contradictions at accessible worlds, thus promoting "¬" to a fully classical negation connective. It should come as no surprise then, that ULL is just MDL in disguise:
A proof outline for Theorem 8 is contained in Section C of the Appendix. 6 Related work
Logics of action and stit-logic
The logics presented in this paper are not defined within either of the two 'main' paradigms for representing actions in (deontic) logic, i.e. stit-logic [8, 9, 22, 26] and dynamic logic [10, 31] . Nonetheless, our ◻ J operators resemble in some respects the Chellas stit or cstit operators used in stit logic. In our framework, a formula ◻ J A is interpreted as "J brings about A". In stit-logic, a formula [J stit ∶ A] is interpreted as "J sees to it that A". On both accounts, A is a state of affairs, and not an action nominal as is the case in e.g. dynamic logic. Moreover, the notions of refrainment and deliberative agency as defined in Section 2.2 are analogous to those of stit logic.
A first major difference between the logics defined here and stit-logics is that the stit-framework is temporal/prospective, while we work in an atemporal setting. It is a question for future research to extend the framework given here with the ability to reason about future (and maybe past) states.
A second difference between both approaches is that the ◻ J operators defined here are S4-modalities, while cstit operators -their analogues in stit logic -are S5-modalities. Thus, in MDL the (5 J ) schema is invalid:
Note that if (5 J ) were valid, then the 'Brouwerian' schema (B J ) too would hold for our agentive operators:
Intuitively, (B J ) requires that if A is the case, then all agents guarantee that A is consistent with their actions. This is a very strong requirement. If A is indeed the case, then normally we try to act on this fact as much as possible. But there are exceptions. We might, for instance, not know that A is the case, we might not be aware of it etc. In such cases, A need not be consistent with our actions. Therefore we opted to leave (B J ) (and, consequently, (5 J )) out of our axiomatization.
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A third difference worth pointing out is that our systems differ from stit logics in their treatment of collective actions and obligations. In stit logic, operators for agency are closed under 'weakening' by the addition of further agents: If J ⊂ K ⊆ ∅ I, then if J sees to it that A, then K sees to it that A. As illustrated in (5) and (6) , this kind of weakening is invalid in the logics defined here. Consequently, a statement like (66) is ML-,MDL-,PMDL-, and PMDL x -consistent, while its stit analogue would cause explosion:
Let us further illustrate this property by generalizing it to the deontic setting. Suppose that two agents i and j are divorced and that they work for the same company. Then we can imagine that, when faced with a certain task A, it makes sense for the boss k to issue the following obligations:
Thus, one of i and j should bring about A, but they should not do it together (because since the divorce they are no longer on speaking terms). Finally, the logics presented in this paper allow for the consistent formalization of other-agent nested agentive formulas of the form "J brings it about that K brings it about that A" (i.e. ◻ J ◻ K A). In the stit-framework, this is 12 A very welcome consequence of not having (5 J ) is that -as opposed to refrainment for the cstit-operator -refrainment for the ◻ J -operator does not collapse into simple non-action:
In stit theory, refraining is for this reason modelled in terms of the deliberative stit-operator (see [22, Sec. 2 
.3.3]).
13 A notable exception here is the sstit or 'strictly sees to it that' operator for joint agency as defined in [8] . See also [9, pp. 284-287] .
impossible (see [9, Sec. 10B.1] for a proof of the impossibility of other-agent nested stits).
Altogether, these differences motivate our approach as a pursuit-worthy alternative for existing logics of action.
Conflict-tolerant deontic logic
SDL can be made more conflict-tolerant either by enriching its language, or by weakening its axioms and/or rules. In [26] , Kooi and Tamminga deal with conflicting norms by enriching SDL so as to be capable of distinguishing between various sources and interest groups in view of which norms arise. Moreover, following [22] they equip their system with modal stit-operators for dealing with the difficult notion of (moral) agency. Similarly, we could try to deal with conflicting norms by imposing a preference ordering on our obligations and permissions, e.g. [20] .
Such extensions are very successful in increasing the expressive power of SDL, but they are unable to consistently accommodate all normative conflicts. Conflicts may arise between norms promulgated at the same time, by the same authority. It is not difficult to see how we could extend this type of reasoning to norms of the same footing, addressed at the same group of people etc. so that in the end we need a logic that invalidates at least some SDL-theorems if we want to deal with all instances of normative conflicts.
PMDL r and PMDL m weaken SDL by dropping (ECQ). In a non-agentive setting, paraconsistent deontic logics were presented in [6, 7, 11, 34] . Notwithstanding their representation of agents, the logics presented here are closely related to the system DP r from [7] . However, whereas DP r uses the paraconsistent logic CLuNs as its LLL, PMDL r and PMDL m use an agentive extension of Priest's LP.
Next to the paraconsistent approach adopted here, other strategies can be adopted for weakening SDL. A popular strategy is to weaken the aggregation principle (ANDO). In a non-monotonic, non-agentive setting, this strategy was adopted in e.g. [18, 21, 23, 29, 30] . Another strategy open for accommodating normative conflicts is to weaken the inheritance principle (INHO). This approach was adopted in e.g. [14, 15, 39, 41] .
Adaptive deontic logic
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper builds on earlier work on agentive adaptive deontic logics. More specifically, it continues the task set out in [6] of constructing a multi-agent adaptive deontic logic capable of tolerating normative conflicts. The system PMDL x improves on the semantics defined in [6] in various ways.
First, PMDL x is built 'on top' of the paraconsistent logic LP, whereas the logic MDP m from [6] is built 'on top' of the paraconsistent logic CLuNs from e.g. [2, 5] . The advantage of LP is that its implication is non-detachable and hence provides a better isolation of normative conflicts. For instance, from OA, O¬A, and O(A ⊃ B) we cannot derive OB by means of PMDL
x , but we can derive OB by means of MDP m . Second, the language of PMDL x has no restrictions whatsoever on nested modal operators. This flexibility makes it easier to extend the language in various ways by adding extra modalities for representing e.g. knowledge, beliefs, commitments of agents and groups.
Third, as opposed to MDP m , PMDL x does not allow for distribution over disjunctive actions:
Suppose, for instance, that an agent flips a coin. In doing so she guarantees that either heads or tails will be the outcome, but she cannot determine the exact outcome of the flip. Hence she does not bring it about that heads is the outcome or bring it about that tails is the outcome. Fourth, PMDL x is equipped with an adaptive proof theory, as illustrated in Section 5.1, whereas MDP m was only characterized semantically. Moreover, unlike MDP m , PMDL x has a regular Kripke-semantics. Altogether, this makes PMDL x the first sound and complete Kripke-style agentive adaptive (deontic) logic.
Most adaptive deontic logics interpret the given premises as non-conflicting as possible. However, they can also be applied in order to render defeasible other inferences and apply these "as much as possible". This has been realized for instance in the context of conditional obligations such as O(A B): A is obligatory if B is the case. In [40] factual detachment is defeasibly applied to O(A B) and B in order to derive the non-conditional obligation OA. Similarly, in [39] strengthening the antecedent is applied to O(A B) defeasibly in order to derive O(A B ∧ C).
For some other adaptive deontic logics that can consistently accommodate instances of normative conflicts, see [7, 29, 39, 41] . For an introduction to the framework of adaptive logics, see [3] .
Conclusion and outlook
We presented the logics PMDL r and PMDL m , two non-classical, non-monotonic logics for reasoning about conflicting collective actions and norms in a multiagent setting. These logics consistently allow for a broad variety of conflicts thanks to their paraconsistent negation connective. Due to their characterization within the adaptive logics framework for non-monotonic reasoning, the systems are sufficiently powerful to account for intuitive instances of rules like Modus Ponens, Disjunctive Syllogism and Contraposition -rules that are invalid in many monotonic paraconsistent logics. The adaptive proof theory of PMDL r and PMDL m explicates defeasible inference steps in a natural way and closely mirrors actual reasoning.
PMDL r and PMDL m are the first agentive adaptive logics characterizable within a regular Kripke-style semantics. For this reason, they are well-suited for adding more expressivity to their language. We could, for instance, relativize the deontic operators in order to express by which authority various norms are issued. Moreover, it would be interesting to add epistemic modalities to the framework in order to express e.g. which agents and groups know each other's obligations. Future work also includes making the framework temporal, and perhaps adding to the language the power to express such notions as commitment or trust.
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APPENDIX A The axiomatization of LP
LP is axiomatized as follows:
Moreover, the bottom constant ( ) is characterized by the following rule:
(ii) The following rule holds in PMDL for each J ⊆∅ I:
It is easy to see that (i) follows by means of (RBC) and (ii) by means of (T◻ J ) and (T J ).
B Soundness and completeness for PMDL
As ML and MDL are fairly standard normal modal logics, we do not prove soundness and completeness theorems for these logics. Instead, we prove soundness and completeness for the more complex system PMDL.
Where R ⊆ W × W we use in the remainder the notation Rw = {w ′ ∈ W Rww ′ }.
Proof. We show this by an induction over the length of A. Let A ∈ P. 
The arguments for the rules (INH J ), (INHO) and (INHP) are analogous and left to the reader.
Definition 12. Let Ψ PMDL be the set of all prime and PMDL-deductively closed subsets of L MDL .
Definition 13. We define R J ⊆ Ψ PMDL × Ψ PMDL as follows: R J Γ∆ iff (a) whenever ◻ J A ∈ Γ then A ∈ ∆, and (b) whenever A ∈ ∆ then J A ∈ Γ.
Definition 14. We define R O ⊆ Ψ PMDL × Ψ PMDL as follows: R O Γ∆ iff (a) whenever OA ∈ Γ then A ∈ ∆, and (b) whenever A ∈ ∆ then PA ∈ Γ.
Proof. Ad (i): We prove the statement by means of an induction on the number of inference steps n needed to derive B from Γ in PMDL. Suppose R = (AND) and B is derived from A1, A2 ∈ Γ. Note that OA1, OA2
The arguments for R ∈ {(AND◻ J ), (AND ′ ◻ J ) J ⊆∅ I} are analogous and left to the reader.
"n ⇒ n + 1": Suppose B is derived from Γ in n + 1 inference steps from A1, . . . , Am by means of rule R. By the induction hypothesis {OA A ∈ Γ} ⊢ PMDL OAi for all i ≤ m. If R ∉ {(AND), (ANDO), (AND ′ O), (AND◻ J ), (AND ′ ◻ J ) J ⊆∅ I}, then m = 1 and A1 ⊢ PMDL B and hence by (INHO) also OA1 ⊢ PMDL OB. In case R ∈ {(AND), (ANDO), (AND ′ O), (AND◻ J ), (AND ′ ◻ J ) J ⊆∅ I} the argument is analogous to the one given above and is left to the reader.
Ad (ii), (iii) and (iv) : This can be shown by an induction similar as in (i) and is left to the reader.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 3. We use (AND◻ J ), (AND ′ ◻ J ), Lemma 2iii, and Lemma 2iv instead of (ANDO), (AND ′ O), Lemma 2i, and Lemma 2ii respectively.
Proof. Ad (i): Let C = ⋁ I Ci where Ci ∈ Γ P for all i ∈ I. Assume C ∈ Cn PMDL (Γ A O ) then by Lemma 3ii, P ⋁ I Ci ∈ Γ. Hence, by (ORP) and the deductive closure of Γ, also ⋁ I PCi ∈ Γ. Since Γ is prime, there is an i ∈ I such that PCi ∈ Γ and hence Ci ∉ Γ P ,-a contradiction. We now show that ∆ is prime. Suppose A1 ∨ A2 ∈ ∆. Assume that A1, A2 ∉ ∆. By the construction, ∆ ∪ {A1} ⊢ PMDL D1 and ∆ ∪ {A2} ⊢ PMDL D2 for some D1, D2 ∈ Γ P . Hence, by (OR1), ∆ ∪ {A1} ⊢ PMDL D1 ∨ D2 and by (OR2) ∆ ∪ {A2} ⊢ PMDL D1 ∨ D2. Hence, by Fact 1, ∆ ∪ {A1 ∨ A2} ⊢ PMDL D1 ∨ D2 and since A1 ∨ A2 ∈ ∆, ∆ ⊢ PMDL D1∨D2 and hence D1∨D2 ∈ ∆ by the deductive closure of ∆. However, D1∨D2 ∈ Γ P ,-a contradiction with (2). 
C Proof of Theorem 8
The following fact holds since MDL strengthens classical propositional logic. Lemma 18. The following is valid in ULL:
